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is a cause per accidens” (14), and that “there is no consummate badness
(summum malum)” (15).196
Aquinas’s reasons for producing this elaborate treatment of natural
and moral badness at this very early stage of the development of his account
of providence remain to be seen.
IV. GOD AS NATURE’S GOAL
1. Reorientation
At the end of Book III’s first, introductory chapter, Aquinas divides his
projected investigation of divine providence into three big topics, the first
of which he characterizes as having to do with “God himself in so far as
he is the end of all things,” God’s omega-aspect (1.1867b).197 Since III.64
is unmistakably the beginning of Aquinas’s investigation of the second big
topic, God’s universal governance, it looks offhand as if he intends to
devote chapters 2–63 to his treatment of God as the universal goal.198 In
the first two of those chapters Aquinas does carry out a general investiga-
tion of the nature of agents, actions, and ends that makes an altogether
appropriate preamble to a consideration of his thesis that God is (some-
how) the unique, universal, ultimate goal of the actions of created
agents.199 However, as we’ve just seen, Aquinas’s chapters 4 through 15
constitute a treatise on badness. God is mentioned only briefly in the twelve
chapters that make up the treatise, and it’s unclear how, if at all, Aquinas
intends his analysis of badness to contribute to his consideration of God
as goal.200 So, setting aside the uncertainly relevant treatise on badness, it
seems right to say that Aquinas’s investigation of God’s omega-aspect oc-
cupies not III.2–63 but just III.2–3 and 16–63.201 Within that latter series
of chapters, he devotes III.16–24 to God as the goal of created things
generally, the topic of this chapter, and III.25–63 to God as the ultimate
goal of human beings specifically.
In chapter 16, Aquinas resumes the line of development that seems to
have been interrupted by the treatise on badness, and he does so in a way
that apparently acknowledges the interruption. In view of his having argued
in chapter 2 that “every agent acts for an end” and in chapter 3 that “every
agent acts for something good,” it surely looks as if the main reason for
arguing in chapter 16 that “something good is the end of each and every
being” (16.1985) must be to remind the reader of what has already been
established, before the treatise on badness. And, in fact, each of III.16’s four
paragraphs is closely related to one or more paragraphs in III.2 and 3.202
Apparently, then, the primary function of III.16 is to reset the stage for a
resumption of the account of agents, actions, and ends designed to lead to
an explanation and justification of Aquinas’s thesis that God is nature’s
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goal. Chapter 16 adds nothing substantive to the line of development begun
in III.2–3, not even a reference to God, who goes unmentioned also in those
two chapters at the head of the line.
2. Reintroducing God
On the basis of chapter 16’s review and reorientation, Aquinas begins
again in chapter 17 to move forward along the main line of development
in at least two respects. For one thing, he now uses ‘ultimate end’ in an
absolute, universal sense (as he typically wasn’t using it earlier in Book
III).203 This is already apparent in the chapter’s thesis, that “all things
are in an ordered relationship to a single good as their ultimate end”
(1989). Improbable as this thesis seems at first glance, it does have the
look of a natural step to be taken by someone trying to show that God
is nature’s goal, in whatever sense Aquinas means to defend that claim.
For another thing, it’s in chapter 17 that Aquinas explicitly reintroduces
God as essential to the universal teleological account he’s developing in
Book III. Although the chapter’s thesis stops short of identifying the “sin-
gle good” it refers to, every one of the chapter’s eight arguments explicitly
identifies it as God himself.
The first of those arguments is an attempt to identify the single good
as God by inferring the identification from considerations developed in
III.2–3 and reviewed in III.16. The argument has two fatal but instructive
flaws. In the first place, its opening inference is plainly invalid:
If nothing tends toward any thing as an end except in so far as that
thing is good, then it must be that what is good, in so far as it is good,
is an end. Therefore, whatever is the highest good is above all (maxime)
the end of all things.204 (17.1990)
In order to support the crucial subconclusion derived in the second sen-
tence, this opening inference needs more than it provides in its one prem-
ise;  and some of what  it  needs it really cannot  get.  For  instance, the
inference would look stronger if it included a premise that can be found
explicitly in another of the chapter’s arguments: “all things are found to be
ordered in various degrees of goodness under a single  highest good”
(17.1993). But of course this premise itself needs support. It seems very
unlikely that all goods can be plausibly ordered in such a way that the
various rankings plainly converge as they go up, even if we leave the ranking
principles altogether implicit and intuitive. Consider just physical and intel-
lectual pleasures, and take it for granted that the latter goods generally
outrank the former, whatever the ranking of goods within each sort might
be. The pleasure of proving a mathematical theorem, then, is a higher good
than the pleasure of scratching an itch. But, even so, it doesn’t follow that
proving a theorem is for all things a higher good than scratching an itch.
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Of course it’s as plausible as it is inane to say, in very broad terms, that just
as God is even better than theorem-proving, so is he far, far better than
itch-scratching. However, the ranking of goods, even as crudely as that, isn’t
all that’s at issue here.
What else is at issue might be described as the truth or falsity of the
single, conditional premise. Its antecedent, “nothing tends toward any thing
as an end except in so far as that thing is good,” may be granted on the basis
of III.3, but its consequent, “it must be that what is good, in so far as it is good,
is an end,” seems plainly false. For something to be X’s end, it must be not
only something good but also something that X intends or at least can intend
(in the broad sense of ‘intend’ Aquinas is using in this investigation). 205 And
Aquinas would agree that if X is a cat, X cannot intend any intellectual
pleasure; and so no such higher good can be an end for a cat. But if that
whole range of higher goods, or ends, is closed to cats, then what’s to show
that any cat could tend toward the highest good? What’s to show that “the
highest good is above all the end of all things,” including cats? Even if we
grant that all ends are goods, we have reason to deny, or at least to doubt, the
premise’s overstated consequent—namely, that all goods are ends.
Five more of the arguments of III.17 are like this first one in that they
set out to infer the identification of the single good as God.206 None of them
is as flawed as the one we’ve just been looking at, but neither is any of them
convincing. The most interesting of these five is the chapter’s eighth and
last argument, based on the etiological ordering of the four causes:
The etiological ordering of causes (in lines 3–8) might seem to be
borrowing plausibility unfairly just because in place of efficient causes in
general it features “agents,” which we’re naturally inclined to think of as
cognitive agents, who act for ends in the full-fledged sense in which we do.
Still, Aquinas’s arguments in III.2 for broadening the concepts of agent and
of end entitle him to this usage here.207
The end takes first place among the other kinds of causes,
and all the other kinds of causes derive from it their function-
ing as actual causes. For an agent does not act except for an
end (as was shown [in III.2]), but it is by an agent that matter
is brought to the actuality of a form. So matter becomes
actually the matter of this particular thing, and, similarly, a
form becomes the form of this particular thing, through the
action of an agent and, consequently, through an end. More-
over, since nothing is moved toward a proximate end except
for the sake of an ulterior end, a posterior end is the cause of
a preceding end’s being [actually] intended as an end. There-
fore, the ultimate end is the first cause of everything. But
being the first cause of everything is necessarily associated
with the first being, which is God (as was shown above [in
II.15]). Therefore, God is the ultimate end of all things.
(17.1997)
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But the crucial principle in lines 9–10 is harder to justify on the basis
of anything we’ve seen so far. Consider this example from the fourth of
Aquinas’s arguments in III.17:
Among all ordered ends the ultimate end must be the end of all the
preceding ends. For instance, if a potion is made up to be given to a sick
man, and it’s given in order to purge him, and he’s purged in order to be
made thinner, and he’s made thinner in order to be healthier, then [his]
health must be the end of the thinning, of the purging, and of the other
things that precede it in this ordered series of ends. (17.1993)
In the example, the man’s health is “the ultimate end” referred to in the
first sentence, albeit only a relatively ultimate end.208 It doesn’t strain imagi-
nation to take the example just one step further in a recognition that the
man’s health is achieved for the sake of his happiness. But this familiar sort
of ordering of ends does tend to come to a stop at the point at which we
recognize a person’s happiness as the ultimate end of the person’s activity,
and that individual ultimate end is obviously far from being either universal
or readily identifiable as God.209 Nevertheless, Aquinas proceeds in that
same fourth argument (following the example) as if he has grounds on
which to move from this ordering of mundane, individualized ends to God
himself as the universal end:
Now all things are found to be ordered in various degrees of goodness
under a single highest good, which is the cause of all goodness. Conse-
quently, since goodness has the defining characteristic of an end, all
things are ordered under God as ends preceding an ultimate end.
Therefore, the end of all things must be God. (17.1993)
The flaw in this generalizing part of the argument is its dependence on what
I’ve just identified as the overstated consequent in the premise of the first
argument’s opening inference, represented here in the claim that “good-
ness has the defining characteristic of an end.”
Aquinas’s arguments in chapter 17, in which he tries to derive the
identification of God as the universal ultimate goal from general considera-
tions regarding ends or goods, are all unsatisfactory. However, there are also
two arguments of a stronger sort in III.17, a sort that works directly from
claims already established about the nature and activity of God.210 One of
those two arguments, the chapter’s sixth, deserves a closer look. It depends
on four established theses: (1) “the primary agent of all things is God (as
was proved in the second book [in II.15])”; (2) “the end of God’s will is
nothing other than his own goodness [argued in I.74]”; (3) God’s goodness
“is God himself (as was proved in the first book [in I.37–8])”; (4) “there can
be nothing that does not have its being from God (as was proved in the
second book [in II.15])” (17.1995).
THE METAPHYSICS OF PROVIDENCE 159
In the first part of this sixth argument, Aquinas prepares the ground
for the introduction of these theses by developing some general points
about agents and ends:
An ordering among ends follows from an ordering of agents. For just
as the highest agent [in an ordered series of agents] moves all the
secondary agents, so all the ends of the secondary agents must be in an
ordered relationship to the highest agent’s end. For the highest agent
does whatever it does for the sake of its end, but the highest agent
activates the actions of all the lower agents by moving all of them
toward their actions and, consequently, toward their ends. From this it
follows that all the ends of the secondary agents are ordered by the
primary agent toward its own end. (17.1995)
At this point in the argument, Aquinas introduces theses (1), (2), and (3),
enabling him to conclude that “all things whatever that are made by God,
whether directly or by means of secondary causes, are ordered toward God
as toward their end” (17.1995); for (1) God is the universally primary agent,
(2) whose end is his own goodness, (3) which is identical with himself.
Finally, then, on the basis of thesis (4), that absolutely everything must have
its being from (or be directly or indirectly made by) God, “all things are in
an ordered relationship toward God as toward their end” (17.1995).
Of all the arguments Aquinas offers in chapter 17, the sixth is the
strongest, partly because in it he relies on previously well-argued theses about
God. Despite the already noticed problems about the ordering of goods and
of ends, there can’t be similar problems about a single ordering of agents,
given what Aquinas has established in SCG so far. Even if there are disparate
orders of secondary agents, such that there is no single non-divine agent that
is primary relative to all those orders, at this point in Aquinas’s natural
theology God is to be acknowledged as the universal primary (and omnis-
cient and omnipotent) agent, linking all orders of secondary agents to him-
self as ultimately primary—like the supreme commander of a far-flung army
the various units of which are controlled directly by obedient sub-command-
ers who have no power over or even knowledge of any of the other units.
This sixth argument also offers the first glimmer of light on what might
be meant by saying that God himself is a goal or end. I’ve regularly inserted
a parenthetical ‘somehow’ into my statements or quotations of Aquinas’s
thesis that God is the unique, universal, ultimate goal of created things,211
just because it seems offhand to make no sense to identify a person as the
goal of other agents’ activities.212 Where X is a person, we know what it
would mean to have as a goal X’s forgiveness or X’s love, becoming more
like X, knowing X better, living one’s life with X, etc., etc. But what could it
mean to have as one’s goal just X herself or himself? A beginning of an
answer to this question is suggested here: All the ends of all secondary
agents are ordered by the universally primary agent toward its own end; the
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universally primary agent 5 God; God’s own end 5 God’s own goodness 5
God himself; therefore, the ends of all secondary agents are ordered toward
God himself.
At least two features of this beginning of an answer are worth noting.
In the first place, since the identification of God’s goodness with God
himself depends on God’s unique absolute simplicity,213 it’s no wonder that
the identification of any other person as a goal should make no sense. In the
second place, if the full explanation of Aquinas’s thesis is going to develop
along this line, then it looks as if no secondary, created agent—not even a
human being or a purely intellective substance—need have God himself as
its consciously intended end. According to this beginning of an explanation,
God himself is the consciously intended end only of God, the universally
primary agent himself, and only in a sense that depends entirely on God’s
own absolute simplicity. On this view as presented so far, then, every created
thing has God himself as its ultimate end only on the basis of a technicality
that no creature need be aware of, much less understand. In fact, it seems
so far that Aquinas’s universal teleology doesn’t require that any creature,
however advanced, be aware even that God himself is its ultimate end. As
described so far, the mechanism of this teleology will draw all things to God
whether or not any of them knows it or wills it.
3. How God is the Absolutely Ultimate, Universal, Unique End
In these circumstances, it’s especially appropriate that Aquinas opens the
very next chapter by acknowledging that “we still have to find out how God is
the end of all things” (18.1999). With characteristic thoroughness, he first
distinguishes two kinds of ends, one of which God himself could not be. As
we’ve seen, ends come first in the etiological ordering of causes: without a fi-
nal cause to move it to action, no potential efficient cause brings about any
effect.214 But at least some agents can be moved by a kind of end that does not
yet exist outside the agent’s intention, something that the agent’s action is in-
tended to bring into existence. All final causes are etiologically first, but this
kind of end or final cause is also existentially last in the ordering of causes:
there is a kind of end that is posterior in being, even though in respect
of intention it does have first place causally. This happens, of course, in
connection with any end that an agent by its own action brings about
(constituit). For instance, a doctor brings about [someone’s] health by
his acting on a sick person. All the same, that person’s [presently
non-existent] health is the doctor’s end. (18.2000)
The unhealthy patient’s healthiness is the end that moves the doctor to act so
as to bring that end into existence; it’s what the doctor intends before he
actually does anything to bring it about; it’s the goal that moves him to do the
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things he does in order to bring it about. But the patient’s healthy state
actually exists only after (and because) the doctor has carried out his inten-
tion. Obviously, God as the end of all things can’t be an end of this kind.
But there is another kind of end that takes precedence in being just as
it does in causing, as when we call that an end which something intends
to acquire (acquirere) by its action or motion. Fire, for instance, intends
to acquire a higher place through its movement; and a king intends to
acquire a city through battle. God, therefore, is the end of things in the
sense of something that is to be attained (obtinendum) by every single
thing in its own way.215 (18.2000)
If, as seems plausible, ends to be brought about and ends to be attained or
acquired are the only two kinds of ends there are, then God himself must
of course be an end of this second kind.
But how, exactly, is God himself to be attained by a created thing? Surely
not in anything like the way the crown of the tree is finally attained by the
fire that inexorably burns its way upward, and even more surely not in the
way the conquered city is finally possessed by the victorious king. In class-
ifying God as an end to be attained rather than brought about, this argu-
ment supplies what is hardly needed at this stage of Aquinas’s natural
theology.216 In its two examples of ends to be attained, it seems more
obfuscating than illuminating. And, at the very end, it bundles into its
conclusion an important point that has neither been argued for nor ex-
plained: “God . . . is to be attained by every single thing in its own way.” On
the contrary, as we saw in the preceding section, the sixth argument of III.17
leaves the impression that God himself is everything’s end in a way that has
nothing to do with any distinctions among kinds of things and the various
ways in which they might be thought to have God as their ultimate end. This
first argument of III.18 can’t be said to have supported its whole conclusion,
nor does it make much progress in showing just how God is the end of all
things. None of the chapter’s three other arguments surpasses the first in
that latter respect.217 In the end, chapter 18’s contribution to explaining
how God himself is the universal end reduces to the simple, utterly obvious
observation that God must be an already existent end to be attained rather
than an as yet non-existent end to be brought about.
However, III.18 merely opens the inquiry into ways in which created
things may be said to have God himself as their end. In III.19 Aquinas
advances the inquiry by making a different use of III.18’s distinction between
kinds of ends, as can be seen in a careful reading of the new chapter’s
opening sentence: “Now from the fact that created things acquire (acquirunt)
divine goodness they are made (constituuntur) like God” (19.2004). In other
words, for every created thing, divine goodness is an already existent end to
be acquired; and a thing’s acquiring that end to any degree entails its bring-
ing about an end of the first kind—namely, bringing it about that the thing
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itself is (thereby and to a corresponding degree) like God. Now it’s certainly
true that when X attains to Y’s goodness to any extent, X becomes like Y to
that extent. So becoming like God is an end that is logically posterior to
acquiring divine goodness; and “therefore, if all things tend toward God as
toward their ultimate end in order to achieve (consequantur) his goodness,218
it follows that the ultimate end of things is to become like God” (19.2004).219
In that final clause we have the start of a new sort of answer to the
question of what might be meant by identifying God himself as the ultimate
end. If some degree of some aspect of God’s goodness is the ultimate end
to be achieved and, consequently, becoming like God in some respect and
to some degree is the ultimate end to be brought about, then God himself,
the exemplar that is the criterion for all such likenesses, is the indispensable
super-ultimate end—an end that, considered just as such, can neither be
brought about nor attained. If one of Scott’s students wants more than
anything else to achieve some measure of Scott’s goodness at what he does
and thereby to bring it about that she becomes like him in that respect, then
within that limited context Scott himself is in that same way the indispensa-
ble super-ultimate end. So far, so good.
But this new sort of answer depends on the claims that “all things
tend toward God as toward their ultimate end in order to achieve his
goodness” and that “created things acquire divine goodness.” Since every
end is a good of some kind, there’s no reason why acquiring some measure
of even divine goodness couldn’t be an end, even for creatures. But, more
pertinently, we’ve already seen Aquinas claiming that every goodness of any
sort is an aspect of the perfect divine goodness,220 and there’s another
such claim in chapter 19 itself.221 In making these sweeping claims about
the acquisition of divine goodness as a universal end, he’s depending on
that conception of all goods as aspects of perfect goodness itself; and so
he needn’t be ascribing to any creature a direct intention to acquire some
share of divine goodness considered just as such. A created thing’s conse-
quent assimilation to God can, therefore, also be an ultimate end that is
utterly unrecognized under that description even by a rational creature
that is well on its way to bringing it about in some respect or other. Still,
since Aquinas’s account ascribes the same ultimate end also to all incog-
nizant beings, which are necessarily incapable of recognizing any end to-
ward which they are tending, the fact that the ultimate end goes
unrecognized for what it is also by very many intellective creatures does
not in any way damage his theory.
As Aquinas views it, a created thing’s bringing about in itself a likeness
to God might be described more precisely as its extending and enhancing
the requisite modicum of divine likeness without which the thing could not
have existed to begin with. “Now all things have their being from the fact
that they are made like God, who is subsistent being itself; for all [created]
things exist only as participants in [divine] being” (19.2006). But even in
the respect in which divine likeness is a concomitant of a thing’s existing at
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all, and so a necessary possession of absolutely everything there is, it is
nonetheless also each thing’s end, since
it is quite apparent that things have a natural appetite to be.222 It’s for
this reason that if they can be corrupted by something, they naturally
resist the things that corrupt them and tend in a direction in which
they might be preserved. . . . Therefore, all things have an appetite for
being made like God, as for their ultimate end. (19.2006)
On this basis, then, and in this sense and to this degree absolutely every
created thing might be said to have as at least part of its ultimate end
sustaining its fundamental if slight existential likeness to God.
4. How Created Things are Assimilated to the Divine Goodness
After Aquinas’s chapter 17 argues that God is the end of all things, chapter 18
sets out to show how God is the end of all things. Chapters 19 and 20 are
paired in just the same way: after III.19 argues that all created things intend to
become like God in respect of goodness, III.20 is supposed to show how they
can accomplish this. Although we can by now acknowledge a respect in which
it makes sense to identify God himself as the (super-)ultimate end of all things,
assimilation to God is the absolutely ultimate end that any created thing can
bring about (even if not altogether by itself) in acquiring some measure of
God’s goodness.223 Consequently, Aquinas is now less likely than he was at first
to identify the ultimate end as God himself, but to say instead the sort of thing
he says at the outset of III.20: “it’s clear that to become like God is the
ultimate end of all things” (20.2009). And since “any and every being’s end is
something good,” as III.16 argues (based on III.3), “strictly speaking, things
tend toward becoming like God in so far as God is good” (20.2009), rather
than in so far as God is, say, omnipotent or omniscient.
Of course, in virtue of absolute divine simplicity, no such distinctions
apply strictly to the nature of God, in which omniscience 5 omnipotence
5 goodness 5 God himself, “because for God, to be, to live, to be wise, to
be blessed, and whatever else evidently pertains to perfection and good-
ness—the totality of the divine goodness, so to speak—is the divine being
itself” (20.2010).224 And, of course, although all created things have a
natural tendency to acquire a measure of divine goodness, they
do not attain goodness in the way goodness is in God, even though each
and every thing does imitate the divine goodness in its own way. . . . So
if each [created] thing is good in so far as it is, but none of them is its
own being, then none of them is its own goodness. Instead, each of
them is good by participation in goodness, just as it is a being by
participation in being itself. (20.2010)
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So Aquinas’s first move in explaining how created things acquire divine
goodness is to preclude anyone’s supposing that X’s acquisition of divine
goodness could in any case amount to X’s being its own goodness as God is
his own goodness (or goodness itself). That is (as he has argued before), no
created thing could be absolutely simple.225
Aquinas draws a primary distinction among three grades of substances
(20.2011c)—divine (and thus absolutely simple), separated (from matter but
metaphysically complex), and composite (involving matter as well as form).
This hierarchy is  based on the ways  in  which a substance  has  (or  is)
goodness. The divine substance is its goodness; a separated substance “par-
ticipates in goodness in keeping with that which it is”—that is, a form alone;
“while a composite substance participates in goodness in keeping with some-
thing  belonging to  it”  as a component (20.2011c).  He then draws more
immediately relevant distinctions within what he calls the third grade of
substances, the composites. These comprise all the things that make up the
physical universe: all material objects, all terrestrial and celestial bodies.
What he has to say about differences among levels of terrestrial things, from
the simplest (which he identifies as the elements) to the most complicated
(human bodies) as regards  the ways in which  they share in and thus
manifest the divine goodness is often insightful, and certainly essential to
the development of his project in natural theology. But his sharp metaphysi-
cal distinction between all heavenly bodies on the one hand and all earthly
bodies on the other, based on Aristotelian astronomy, is utterly unten-
able.226 However, although Aquinas makes a great deal of that distinction,
I think it can be set aside without doing irreparable damage to his account
of earthly bodies or even to his view of the way God governs the physical
universe.227 So, setting aside his distinction between heavenly and earthly
bodies, I will consider only  his account  of the  material  substances  he
characterizes as “the elements and the things composed of the elements”
(20.2012b), ignoring (as much as possible) the fact that in his view these are
only the earth itself and such material substances as are found in the earth,
on the earth, and above the earth (but below the lowest of the celestial
spheres, the sphere of the moon).
The elements and all the things composed of them constitute the lower
half of the third (lowest) grade of substances (the upper half being made
up of the heavenly bodies). Their location at the bottom of this metaphysi-
cal hierarchy is determined by a feature of their matter-form (m-f) compo-
sition. In substances of this sort “the form does not fill  up the whole
potentiality of the matter” (20.2012b).228 What this means can be seen by
considering the two consequences he attributes to this ordinary, less-than-
saturated sort of m-f composition. First, in the whole matter of any physical
object “there still remains  a potentiality  for another form”; second,  “in
another part of the matter there remains a [further] potentiality for this
form” that the object already has (20.2012b). That is, physical objects are
essentially susceptible to (1) alteration—a change of forms—and (2) inten-
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sification (or  diminution)—an increase  (or decrease) in the extent  to
which an object’s matter is permeated by a form the object has. Aquinas
does not say whether he means substantial or accidental forms, and he
provides no examples.229 But clear examples involving accidental forms
aren’t hard to find. By putting the end of an iron bar over a flame, I can
alter its form from cold to hot; and by then turning it around and putting
the other end over the flame, I can extend the form of heat into more of
its matter.
As Aquinas sees it, this less-than-saturated sort of m-f composition
characteristic of ordinary material substances means that they must be at
the bottom of the heap also as regards their capacity for acquiring a likeness
to the divine goodness. Their metaphysical composition is uneven, as we’ve
just been seeing, and Aquinas identifies the gaps as privations: “a privation
is a negation in a substance of that which can inhere in the substance”
(20.2012b). So “it’s obvious that adjoined to this form that does not fill up
the whole potentiality of the matter there is a privation of the form”
(20.2012b). It’s such privations, or unactualized potentialities, that underlie
the mutability of material substances, “since it’s obvious that motion [or
change] cannot occur where there is no potentiality for anything else”
(20.2012b). And it is this feature of material substances that relegates them
to last place among substances also as regards their capacity for goodness.
For,
since it’s obvious that badness is the very privation of goodness, it’s
plain that in this last order of substances there is mutable goodness that
is mixed together with the opposing badness—the sort of thing that
can’t happen in the higher orders of substances. Therefore, this kind
of substance, which we’ve described as being in the last mode [of
substances], is the last grade in respect of goodness just as it is the last
grade in respect of being. (20.2012b)
It’s mildly interesting that Aquinas goes so far here as to introduce the
concepts of privation and badness that are central to the treatise on badness
in III.4–15, since this is his first allusion to any of that material after chapter
15. But he might have done better to make his point more generally, based
only on material substances’ mutability, presumably in respect of goodness
as in other respects. For while his claim that “badness is the very privation
of goodness” looks as if it needs no support, the notion of privation he must
rely on here is unacceptably weak by the standards he carefully and em-
phatically develops in the treatise on badness when he’s dealing with the
badness of substances. Here he says broadly—too broadly—that “a privation
is a negation in a substance of that which can inhere in the substance.” On
that criterion, every brunette suffers a privation of blondness (and vice
versa)—the very sort of absurdity he rejects in III.5&6.1899. There he says
that only “in privation understood properly and strictly is there always the
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defining characteristic of badness,” because “every privation, if ‘privation’
is taken properly and strictly, is a privation of something that someone [or
something] [1] is naturally suited to have and [2] ought to have”—the very
terms in which he defines the badness of substances earlier in the same
passage.230
Having distinguished grades of goodness among kinds of m-f compos-
ites generally (celestial and terrestrial), Aquinas goes on to draw finer-
grained distinctions of that sort among kinds of ordinary (terrestrial)
material substances. In devising an order of goodness that’s supposed to
provide a ranking of the composite itself, its form, and its matter, he’s
making good  on his claim that “a composite substance participates in
goodness in keeping with something belonging to it” as a component
(20.2011c).
For since the matter considered in itself is a being in potentiality, while
the form is its actuality, and the composite substance is actually existent
through the form, the form will of course be good in itself while the
composite substance will be good in so far as it has the form, but the matter
will be good in so far as it is in potentiality to the form. . . . (In this
connection it’s apparent that ‘good’ is in a certain respect wider in
scope than ‘being’).231 (20.2013)
If this ranking is really there to be extracted, I suppose that Aquinas’s
reason for spelling it out may be to try to show that it isn’t just each
composite created thing considered as a whole that is assimilated to the
divine goodness, but even its metaphysical components considered just as
such. He sees God as the goal (through likeness to the divine goodness) not
just of each of nature’s primary substances but also of the ultimate meta-
physical components of each of them—an extremely, perhaps excessively,
generous  sense  in which  to claim that  God  is the ultimate end of all
things.232
Perfect goodness is of course essentially and uniquely associated with
absolute simplicity, and we’ve already seen several indications that when
goodness and being as they occur below that summit are considered alto-
gether universally, the higher degrees of accessible goodness correspond to
lower degrees of complexity of being—as in Aquinas’s three grades of
substances.233 But when we’re considering ordinary m-f composite sub-
stances, the relationship between goodness and simplicity is inverted. The
highest degrees of goodness theoretically within the range of such beings
are accessible only to the most complex m-f composites.
God is in possession of the highest perfection of goodness in his very
being. A created thing, on the other hand, possesses its perfection not
in unity but in multiplicity.234 . . . God is said to be powerful (virtuosus),
wise, and active in one and the same respect, but a created thing
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[possesses its versions of such attributes] in various respects. And the
more distant from the first goodness a created thing is found to be, the
more that created thing’s perfect goodness will require greater multi-
plicity. . . . [N]onetheless, lower [corporeal] substances—such as the
elements—are found to be simpler than some of their superiors—such
as animals and human beings—because they cannot attain the perfec-
tion of [sensory] cognition and of intellect that animals and human
beings do achieve. (20.2014)
It’s only such living corporeal things as attain a certain level of complexity
that can be animated by a sensory soul, and it takes a still higher level of cor-
poreal complexity to provide the proximate matter for an intellective soul.235
Aquinas seems to think that he needs to explain how created things
that exist can, nonetheless, be in a position to attain goodness—perhaps
because he argues that anything is good to the extent to which it is, and that
perfect being is perfect goodness.236 Thus, he says that
although God in keeping with his simple being has his goodness per-
fect and whole, created things do not attain to the perfection of their
goodness only through their being, but through several things. For that
reason, even though each of them is good in so far as it is, it cannot be
called good without qualification if it lacks other things that are required
for its goodness. For instance, a man who is destitute of virtue and given
over to vices is indeed called good in a certain respect—namely, in so far
as he is a being, and in so far as he is human. Without qualification,
however, he is called not good but bad. Therefore, for no created thing
is it the same to be and to be good without qualification, even though
each of them is good in so far as it is. (20.2015)
Consequently,
things are ordered toward God as their end not only in respect of
[their] substantial being but also in respect of things that are accidental
to them and pertain to their perfection, and even as regards their
proper operation, which also pertains to the perfection of a thing.
(20.2016)
The special importance of a created thing’s operation as a determinant of
its goodness (or of its likeness to the divine goodness) is borne out in the
rest of Aquinas’s account of God as nature’s goal.237
5. How Created Things are Assimilated to God Through
Causality
When we first encounter Aquinas’s thesis that God himself is the universal,
unique, ultimate goal for all created things, it looks like a powerful but
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mysterious claim—one that needs to be explained before the challenge of
justifying it can be taken up. But now, given the explanation Aquinas has
been developing for it, its justification is looking surprisingly easy, even
perfunctory. It turns out, at least so far, that God himself is each thing’s goal
only in so far as each thing has a natural tendency to become assimilated to
God. Moreover, it turns out that each thing is assimilated to God—wittingly
or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly—in so far as it (a) has being, (b) has
goodness (consequently) in the respects in which and to the extent to
which goodness is being’s essential concomitant, (c) has goodness in re-
spect of certain essential or accidental characteristics that pertain to the
excellence of the sort of thing it is, and (d) has goodness in respect of the
operations that are proper to that sort of thing. Given this explanation of
the thesis so far, absolutely every thing ineluctably achieves its ultimate goal,
at least in respects (a) and (b), merely by showing up in the real world. And
it seems that any natural thing that we would be likely to call good of its
kind,  when we have absolutely no  theological  considerations in  mind,
would count as having achieved its ultimate goal in respects (c) and (d) as
well. So far, then, God’s omega-aspect and the return of all created things
to their creator seem not grandly, cosmically climactic, as those descriptions
and Aquinas’s thesis make them seem, but anticlimactic to the point of
being unnoticeable.238 Aquinas hasn’t quite finished his account of the
assimilation of non-human created things to God, but if it comes to little
more than this in the end, we should be not just disappointed, but in-
structed, too. If his account falls short of our expectations, it won’t have
failed to live up to any promises he’s made about it. For all the grandeur of
its mode of expression, his thesis that absolutely every created thing has
God himself as its ultimate goal certainly admits of the interpretation he’s
giving it.
In III.21 Aquinas presents what at first seems to be an addition not only
to (a)–(d) as aspects of creaturely likeness to God but even to goodness
generally as a respect in which creatures are assimilated to God: “things
intend a divine likeness also in their being causes of other things” (21.2017).
However, as the chapter’s arguments show, the novelty of this claim is only
apparent. It really is a corollary of the claim about the assimilation of
created things to God by way of their acquiring goodness.239 More particu-
larly, it’s a gloss on (d) above, as can readily be seen in a combination of the
chapter’s first and third arguments: “A created thing tends toward a divine
likeness through its operation,” as was pointed out in 20.2016 above. “But
it’s through  its operation that one thing becomes a cause  of another.
Therefore, things intend a divine likeness also in being causes for other
things” (21.2018). Not just goodness itself but also
an ordered relationship to goodness [not yet fully attained or not
wholly the agent’s own] has the defining characteristic of goodness (as
is clear from things already said [in 20.2013]). But each thing has an
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ordered relationship to goodness in virtue of being a cause of some-
thing else. This is because goodness is caused only per se, while badness
is caused only per accidens (as has been shown [in III.10]).240 Therefore,
to be the cause of other things is good. But in keeping with any and
every good to which anything tends, it intends a divine likeness, since
any and every created good is a result of participation in divine good-
ness. Therefore, things intend a divine likeness in their being causes of
other things. (21.2020)
I introduce these two arguments only because they bring out the lack
of real novelty in the claim that things are assimilated to God also in respect
of causality. I don’t think they’re very good arguments, even if we’re thor-
oughly comfortable with Aquinas’s technically broad use of ‘intend.’241 In
the first argument (21.2018), for instance, even if we accept its two premises
(quoted just above), the conclusion follows only in case we restrict the
meaning of ‘intend’ to having an unwitting tendency toward bringing about
some thing, event, or state of affairs. The same restriction applies in the
third argument (21.2020), which also involves difficulties over the etiology
of badness.242
Other arguments in the chapter, those that don’t expressly treat crea-
turely causality as simply an  aspect  of  creaturely  goodness,  are a  little
more interesting if not a great deal better as arguments. For instance,
Aquinas founds the fourth of the chapter’s six arguments on the plausible
claim  that “the  principles through  which an  effect is a cause of other
things are conferred on it by the [effect’s] agent just as are the natural
principles through which the effect subsists” (21.2021). He provides an
example drawn from the univocal causation that is characteristic of bio-
logical reproduction: “just as an animal while it is being generated gets
from its generator a nutritive power, so also does it get a generative [or
reproductive] power.243 Therefore, the effect tends toward a likeness of
the agent not only as regards its species but also as regards its being a
cause  of other things.” But the claim could be exemplified as well by
artificial production. The causal powers that belong to any thing you make
are simply consequences of the ingredients you use and the way you com-
bine them, even when you make a dinner that, apart from your intention
and to your great distress, sickens you and your family with food poison-
ing.244 Consequently, on the basis of that fundamental claim interpreted
as it is in such examples, the conclusion that “an agent intends to assimilate
its patient to itself not only as regards the agent’s being but also as regards
its causality” may  seem to go too far, unless the only agent at issue is
omniscient,  omnipotent  God  himself. The argument’s final conclusion
does suggest such an aim:
things tend toward a likeness of God as effects tend toward a likeness
of the agent (as was shown [in III.19]). Therefore, there is a natural
intention in things to become like God in being causes of other things.
170 NORMAN KRETZMANN
But that’s not what the rest of the argument suggests, especially because
Aquinas’s only example involves biological reproduction, a kind of causa-
tion that is definitely not God’s own.245
6. How Different Sorts of Things are Differently Directed
Toward Their End
In discussing Aquinas’s chapter 18, I pointed out that the conclusion of one
of its arguments contains the claim that “God . . . is to be attained by every
single thing in its own way” (18.2000), a claim that is not only unsupported
by that argument but seems also to conflict with the impression that Aqui-
nas’s account had been making until then: that God himself is everything’s
end in a way that has nothing to do with any distinctions among kinds of
things and the various ways in which they might be thought to have God as
their ultimate end.246 The impression has only been deepened through
chapters 19, 20, and 21. However, in III.22 Aquinas is finally ready to explain
in just what respects and to what extent he thinks certain kinds of non-
human things are differently directed toward their ultimate end.
In his view, the relevant differences among kinds of things are to be
found only in fully developed individuals of those kinds. At the end of III.21
he says that before X “can cause another thing,” X must have attained its
full natural development. Unless he’s thinking of X’s causing another thing
solely in terms of biological reproduction, this claim seems ludicrously false:
a two-year-old can make a mud pie. But even if he has tacitly decided that
the only kind of causality that entails being assimilated to God is the causing
of another thing, thinking of it in terms of reproduction alone would
inappropriately narrow the claim to cover only living beings.247 Still, he
concludes on that basis that “although a created thing tends toward a divine
likeness in many ways, this one, whereby it seeks (quaerat) a divine likeness
through being a cause of other things, comes to it last” (21.2023). The
“many ways” he mentions here clearly refer to all modes of assimilation to
God, including all the respects in which a thing is or can be good, as well as
a thing’s simply being.248 But in III.22 the different ways in which he thinks
different things are directed toward their ultimate end are confined to
various sorts of operations:
from things already said it can be made quite clear that the final aspect
through which each and every thing is directed toward its end is its
operation—but in various ways, corresponding to the variety of the
operation. (22.2024)
It’s hard enough to see what Aquinas means at the end of III.21 by picking
out a thing’s acquiring the ability to cause other things as the culminating
stage of its development, but here, at the beginning of III.22, he seems to
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be advancing an even less plausible version of that claim, one in which a
thing’s operation generally depends on its full development.249 I don’t have
a satisfactory explanation of these implausible claims, but I think that their
implausibility doesn’t affect Aquinas’s main purpose in III.22, where the
developmental status of a thing’s ability to perform operations is not an
issue.
Since his aim in this chapter is to sort out the different ways in which
different things are directed toward their ultimate end, it would be natural
to expect that the differences he notes among operations will be fairly
specific, or at least not as unspecific as they turn out to be. However, the
basic distinction he lays down is about as broad as any distinction among
operations could be. “[1] One sort is the operation of a thing as a mover of
something else—for example, heating and cutting” (22.2025). This, of course,
is the very familiar, ubiquitous, transeunt sort of activity—doing something
to something else—that Aquinas has already discussed in some detail in
SCG II in connection with his account of God’s creative activity.250 “[2] An-
other sort is the operation of a thing as moved by something else—for example,
being heated and being cut” (22.2025). Even though Aquinas is cataloging
“operations” (operationes) here rather than activities or actions (actus or
actiones), it may seem very odd that the sheer passivity of being heated or
being cut is included among the very few kinds of operation on the basis of
which Aquinas means to sort out the different routes taken by different
things on their way to their ultimate goal. But his notion of operation really
does seem to have been broad in just that way, as may be seen in, for
example, QDA 12c: “a power is nothing other than a thing’s principle of
operation, whether it is action or passion.” “[3] Another sort of operation
is the perfecting of an actually existing agent without any tendency to bring about a
change in anything else” (22.2025). As this rather odd description may sug-
gest, and as his examples later in this passage confirm, this type-3 operation,
which he discusses elsewhere under the designation ‘immanent activity,’ is
typified in sensation, or in mental activity.251 So for present purposes his
basic distinction among kinds of operation associated with kinds of things
appears to be (1) transeunt activity, (2) passivity, and (3) immanent activity.
Offhand, this is an unlikely basis on which to achieve his aims in this
chapter. To pick out only one of its more obvious drawbacks as a sorting
device, among non-human created things, at least all the higher animals are
characterized by all three of these kinds of operation, and absolutely all
animals, plants, and non-living things seem to be characterized by at least
the first two of these three kinds.
The peculiarities of this basic distinction among kind of operations are
not superficial, but some of the special difficulties in the text immediately
following the distinction may be superficial in the sense that an emendation
of the text would remove them. Still, I haven’t seen just what such an
emendation should be.252 Here is a literal translation of the text presented
in the best editions: “of which they differ in the first place from passivity and
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from moving (motu), in the second place from action (actione) that brings
about a change of external matter” (22.2025). The very next sentence—“In-
tellection, sensation, and volition are instances of this sort of opera-
tion”—provides some basis for retrospectively imposing on the disordered
passage a reasonable facsimile of what must be its intended sense: (3)
Immanent activity differs in the first place from (2) passivity (and from
moving), in the second place from (1) action that brings about a change of
external matter. But this rewriting leaves me uncertain why Aquinas would
bother spelling out in this way the difference between the type-3 operation
and the other two types, and what exactly he means by including “moving”
in this list.253 It’s true that the type-1 operation is a kind of moving (as
distinct from being moved), and when it’s introduced at the beginning of
22.2025, it’s described as such; but it’s much more precisely described in the
final clause of this later sentence. Although the parenthesis in my rewriting
of the passage is awkward, I think that developments in the rest of the
chapter make it look like what Aquinas may have intended here.
Aquinas considers his opening distinction among types of operation,
along with these immediately following comments on the distinction, to have
provided him with grounds on which to move forward with the claim that
it’s obvious that things that either [2] are merely moved or [3] operate
without moving or making anything [are things that] tend toward a
divine likeness in so far as they are [A] perfected in themselves. But
those that [1] make and move something, considered just as such, tend
toward a divine likeness in being [B] causes of other things. Finally,
[1a] those that move [other things] as a result of being moved [themselves]
intend a divine likeness in both respects [A and B]. (22.2025)
It seems clear that A and B, the two kinds of divine likeness sorted out
here, are those that have until now been distinguished as goodness and
causality, respectively. So it seems right to say that the type-2 and type-3
operations promote divine likeness only in respect A—at least in the sense
that they surely don’t do so in respect B. It’s almost as clear that the type-1
operations may be said to tend toward divine likeness in respect B. But I see
no reason why type-1 operations shouldn’t also be recognized as promoting
divine likeness in the other respect: a knife that is having its potentiality for
cutting actualized is thereby having its goodness enhanced, at least in a
technical sense Aquinas recognizes, by bringing into second actuality what
is otherwise merely its first actuality.254 And it’s surprising to find that he
considers even heating and cutting as instances of the causing of other things,
so that even the sun’s warming a stone would somehow qualify as its causing
another  thing.  We’ve seen  the notion  of  causing other  things acquire
importance as this account has developed, partly because there’s some
point in supposing that it’s only productive efficient causality of that sort
that would contribute to a created thing’s likeness to God the creator. If
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merely heating or cutting something else are modes of causality that also
confer divine likeness in respect B, then Aquinas’s use of reproduction in
his examples of respect B, along with some of the things he’s said earlier
about it, seem misleading.255
But it’s the last sentence of the passage quoted above that contains the
most obviously novel and most difficult ingredient in the advance Aquinas is
making here, in a claim that also sets the stage for the remainder of the
chapter. As my numerical designation ‘1a’ is intended to show, I’m inclined
to think that these things that move other things as a result of being moved
themselves are supposed to be a subgroup of 1, the things that move other
things, so that the only other subgroup, 1b, would have to be self-movers,
things that move other things on their own and not as a result of being moved
by something else.256 In any case, it’s only the members of 1a that Aquinas
describes as intending a divine likeness in both respects: A, becoming per-
fected in themselves, and B, causing other things. And so it’s obviously their
being actually moved by something else that constitutes their advancing
toward their own perfection, considered just as movers whose very nature
requires their being moved by other things in order to fulfill their role of
moving still other things. We’ll see more clearly what Aquinas means by this
claim, although not in a way that will explain all its peculiarities.
Some of the difficulties we’ve been encountering in connection with
III.22’s preliminary distinctions among agents and patients, operations and
movements, are a consequence of the abstractness of the distinctions. We
need examples. Aquinas begins to supply them at once, in ways that may
seem surprising as well as elucidating: “terrestrial bodies, in so far as they
are moved with natural movements,257 are considered as merely moved—not
as movers, however, except per accidens” (22.2026). So all the material sub-
stances we know best, including our own bodies, considered just as bodies,
appear to belong in group 2, things whose only natural operation is being
moved by something else. In science’s persistent, perhaps perpetual, hunt
for deeper and deeper explanations of corporeal events and states of affairs,
such a view of the natural world is certainly accepted and even relied on.
Even in our own case (which isn’t specifically at issue yet), Aquinas and
many contemporary philosophers who accept the existence of self-movers
wouldn’t identify the human body or any part of it as a self-mover. Recogniz-
ing a person as a self-mover in no way precludes our wanting to know what
besides her face caused her frown—in psychological terms at least, but per-
haps also in physiological terms. Neither her face alone nor her body
considered in its totality moves itself or anything else, except per accidens, as
a result of first having been moved. Heating and cutting, Aquinas’s para-
digms of type-1 operations, of course involve terrestrial bodies on the active
as well as on the passive side. But the bodies that bring about heating and
cutting per se and not just per accidens are more than inert terrestrial bodies.
They are animated.
In Aquinas’s philosophy of mind, the part or aspect of a person that
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moves any corporeal part or aspect of her—such as her mouth when she
talks, or her hand when she shifts gears—but isn’t moved in turn  by
something else, can’t itself be corporeal. A body moves only when and as
something else moves it.258 That’s one of the reasons Aquinas has for
maintaining that the distinctively human rational soul, including intellect
and will, must itself be incorporeal.259 And it’s on the basis of such consid-
erations that he explains the exclusively per accidens status of (mindless)
terrestrial bodies considered as movers: “For the fact that a falling stone sets
in motion something that was in its way is accidental. It’s like that in the case
of alteration, too, and the other sorts of movement” or change, such as
increase and decrease in size, that are brought about by the movements of
terrestrial bodies (22.2026). The billiard-ball model of cause and effect suits
this account perfectly as regards local motion, and modifying it to suit other
sorts of change as described here does not require much imagination.
But Aquinas’s main topic in III.22 is the different ways in which differ-
ent sorts of things acquire their likeness to God, and his detailed analysis of
the lowly role of terrestrial bodies in the world’s causal scheme now yields
a definitive account of the only way in which they can become like God.
Because they are all members of the purely passive group 2, “the end of
their movement is that they attain to a divine likeness in so far as they are
[A] perfected in themselves,” and they are perfected in so far as they have
“[A1] their proper form and [A2] their proper location” (22.2026). Theo-
retically, their various changes or movements contribute to their attaining
A1 and A2.
Matter, for instance, “tends toward its perfecting” via alteration, “in
virtue of acquiring actually a form that it earlier had potentially, even
though it [then] ceases to have another form that it earlier had actually”
(22.2027). In this account, then, the perfecting of matter consists not in its
acquiring some one superb, consummate form, but simply in its continuing
to actualize its fundamental potentiality of taking on (and putting off)
forms.260 Although matter isn’t, strictly speaking, a terrestrial body, its meta-
physical character and its role as a component of every terrestrial body
make it a paradigm for Aquinas’s claims about the fundamentally passive
status of terrestrial bodies in this connection.
A little later in III.22, in another account of matter’s part in the process
of divine assimilation, he does suggest another sort of perfecting for matter,
one that involves its ascent through ranked forms to the summit of terres-
trial forms:
the more advanced (posterior) and the more perfect any actuality is, the
more fundamentally matter’s appetite is drawn toward it. And so the
appetite of matter by which it seeks form must tend toward the ultimate
and most perfect actuality matter can attain. . . . For prime matter is in
potentiality first of all to the form of an element, but matter existing
under the form of an element is in potentiality to the form of a
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mixture,261 for which reason elements are the [proximate] matter of a
mixture. And [some] matter considered under the form of a mixture
is in potentiality to a vegetative soul, since it is of such a body that a soul
is the actuality. And, again, a vegetative soul is [sometimes] in a state of
potentiality to a sensory soul, while a sensory soul [may be in potential-
ity] to an intellective soul. (22.2030a–b)
Without my bracketed interpolations, the last two sentences of this passage
on the hierarchy of terrestrial forms can be misleading. Vegetative (or nutri-
tive) souls are the forms only of mixed, not elemental, bodies; but obviously
not every mixture constitutes proximate matter for a vegetative soul. A grain
of salt has absolutely no potentiality for existence as a plant—no more in
Aquinas’s view of nature than in ours. Similarly, the generative succession
from a vegetative to a sensory soul is confined to the embryonic development
of animals. What animates dogwood has absolutely no potentiality for ani-
mating dogs. And the succession from a sensory to an intellective soul takes
place only in the pre-natal development of human beings.262
Although the details of this passage are less clear than they should have
been, it does at any rate lay the foundation for the clearly stated natural
hierarchies that immediately follow it:
The process of [human] generation shows this. For in [human] gen-
eration there is first of all a fetus living the life of a plant, later the life
of an animal, and finally the life of a human being. But, among things
that can be generated and corrupted [i.e., terrestrial bodies ] there is
no next, nobler form to be found after that form. Therefore, the end
of all generation is a human soul, and matter tends toward that as
toward its ultimate form.263 Therefore, the elements are for the sake of
(propter) mixed bodies, which are for the sake of living things, among
which plants are for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of the
human being. Therefore, the human being is the end of all generation.
(22.2030c–d)
These hierarchies of generation are bolstered by a hierarchy of preser-
vation that can, much more clearly than the generative hierarchies, be
empirically confirmed:
mixed bodies are sustained through appropriate qualities of [their]
elements, plants are nourished by mixed bodies, animals have their
nourishment from plants, and some more highly developed and
stronger animals from others that are less highly developed and weaker.
(22.2031b)
Taking off from this platform of hierarchies, Aquinas details the natural
supremacy of human beings in ways that show that no other terrestrial
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created things are their equals or superiors in what might be thought of as
a chain of creaturely command:
a human being uses all kinds of things for its own benefit—some for
food, others for clothing. That’s why a human being is brought into the
world naked by nature, as able to prepare clothing for itself from other
things. And that’s why nature prepared no food appropriate for a
human being other than [human] milk, so that it might seek out food
for itself from various things. But a human being uses still other things
for transportation, since people are found to be weaker than many
animals in swiftness of motion and in strength to bear burdens—other
animals having been prepared, so to speak, to help human beings. And,
in addition to all these things, a human being makes use of sensible
things for the perfecting of its intellective cognition. (22.2031c)
Much of this account of human terrestrial supremacy is stage-setting for the
detailed examination to come of the distinctively human assimilation to
God.264
7. Glancing Skyward
However, the detailing of human excellence in III.22 is interwoven with a
feature of Aquinas’s account of nature that is irredeemably false and, from
our point of view, likely to seem incongruous with what he has to say here
about human beings. For the only created things to which he here expressly
assigns type-1a operations—the only type of operation so far assigned that
counts as moving other things per se, the only type that, he says, assimilates
its agent to God in both respects A and B—are the heavenly bodies. He
makes this assignment largely on the basis of Aristotelian astronomical
theories that  can’t any  longer be taken seriously.265 These theories lie
behind his taking it for granted in III.23 that (i) the heavenly bodies have
an indispensable role as movers of terrestrial bodies, especially as regards
their generation. They also lead to the chapter’s lengthy development of
the thesis that (ii) the movers of the heavenly bodies must themselves be
incorporeal, intellective substances. Since the falsity of Aquinas’s account of
the heavenly bodies isn’t merely superficial, and since the account seems
not to be nearly so important to his natural theology as he believed it to be,
I won’t examine it in any detail. But I want to make just a few remarks about
his view of the heavenly bodies as (i) movers contributing to terrestrial
developments and as (ii) movers that are themselves dependent on being
moved by intellective substances.266
John Russell provides a very helpful summary of the problems Aquinas
thought were best solved in terms of his thesis that (i) heavenly bodies are
movers contributing to terrestrial developments:
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(1) the inadequacy of the Aristotelian four elements with their limited
set of properties—warm or cold, moist or dry, heavy or light—to ex-
plain the great diversity of inorganic compounds; (2) the particular
difficulty of explaining how entirely new properties such as magnetism,
or life, could emerge spontaneously from these elementary properties;
(3) the tendency of terrestrial bodies to belong to a limited number of
well-defined species, which suggested that every member of a given
species must have been determined by a single universal causal agent;
(4) the stability and order of the universe as a whole, which seemed to
go far beyond the capacities of matter as such. All these considerations
pointed to some higher unifying cause which transcended the limita-
tions of the terrestrial realm.267
Of course, Aquinas could have brought on omniscient, omnipotent God
himself as a deus ex machina whose direct, ubiquitous intervention would
effortlessly dispel all these problems and more, in the style of seventeenth-
century occasionalism.268 But to do so would have required him to suppose
that God had given the vast perpetual motion machine that surrounds the
earth no practical purpose in creation commensurate with its complex
grandeur.269 At the end of the twentieth century, a natural-theological
account of terrestrial processes doesn’t face all the problems Russell sets
out, mainly because we aren’t faced with the special difficulties presented
in  the  four-elements theory. But  the problems  in his list that are still
recognizable could now be given nonoccasionalist explanations that are,
like Aquinas’s, attempts to identify and describe the device through which
the creator organizes and controls nature. Putting the matter in appropri-
ately broad terms, the theoretical role played by Aquinas’s heavenly bodies
has been taken over by the basic physical-chemical structure of the universe
and the laws of nature.
As for (ii), the thesis that the heavenly bodies’ terrestrial causality
depends on its being the case that “the prime mover of the movement of
the heavens is something intellective” (23.2034), Aquinas first develops and
defends it in six complex arguments (23.2035–40), the most illuminating
being perhaps the second of them, in 2036. He devotes most of the rest of
the chapter to arguing that the movement of the heavens is “natural”
despite having “something intellective” as its source.
Nonetheless, it must not be denied that the movement of the heavens
is natural. For any movement is said to be natural in virtue not only of
an active but also of a passive principle. . . . [T]he movement of a
heavenly body is not natural, but rather voluntary and intellective, as
far as its active principle is concerned. As far as its passive principle is
concerned, however, it is natural, since a heavenly body has a natural
aptitude for that sort of movement. (23.2041)
Although no twentieth-century natural theology could incorporate any
of the details of Aquinas’s account of the source of astronomical move-
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ments, any theistic cosmology would have to include some version of the
main thesis of Aquinas’s chapter 23, that “the prime mover of the
movement of the heavens is something intellective” (23.2034)—namely,
God—even if that intellective prime mover plays that role only via a divinely
instituted system of natural laws. And so the chapter’s concluding para-
graph is especially reassuring, although it doesn’t offer precisely this (as yet
unimagined) option among its acceptable interpretations. Aquinas’s lack of
commitment to any particular one of the interpretations is appropriate and
attractive, an apparent indication that he had a keen sense of the radically
speculative character of the details of his account of the nature and opera-
tions of the heavenly bodies:
Now as long as it has been established that heavenly movement stems
from an  intellective substance, it  makes no  difference for present
purposes whether [a] a heavenly body is moved by an intellective
substance conjoined with it, which is its soul, or [b] by a separated
substance; or whether [c] each of the heavenly bodies is moved by God
directly, or [d] none of them is moved by God directly but by means of
created intellective substances; or whether [e] only the first is moved
by God immediately but the others by means of created substances.
(23.2045)
8. How Even Nonintellective Things can Acquire a Divine
Likeness
From very near the beginning of this investigation of Aquinas’s thorough-
going teleology with its unique, universal, ultimate goal, it has been obvi-
ous that the difficulties of applying it to nonhuman nature and, further,
to noncognitive and nonliving nature would be even greater than those
associated with applying it to us.270 Nevertheless, Aquinas has largely by-
passed this special difficulty so far, primarily by imposing a broadened,
technical sense of such terms as ‘agent’ and ‘intend’ in order to include
incognizant created things within his account.271 He has, of course, noted
some relevant differences between cognizant and incognizant agents;272
but he has also, and perhaps more often, sketched an all-inclusive account
of the way God’s directing of created things—cognizant and incognizant
alike—toward their goal is an extension of his having created them.273
God’s general governance of creation consists in providing for every sort
of created thing at least (a) its ultimate end—that is, whatever is best for
its nature (and, as we’ll soon see, for something else as well); (b) the
principles or faculties that equip it to act in ways that tend toward that
end; and (c) some direction on its way toward its ultimate end. God’s
providing (a) and (b) is naturally associated with his creating, and (c) is
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specifically associated with God’s absolutely universal directing of created
things. According to Aquinas,
The effect of this governance of course appears in various ways in
connection with various things, in accordance with the difference of
their natures. Some things are produced by God in such a way that,
having intellect, they bear his likeness and represent his image. For that
reason they are not only directed; instead, they also direct themselves
toward their requisite end in accordance with their own actions.
(1.1865)
Along with all other created things, human beings are subject to, depend-
ent on, divine direction. But simply in virtue of their intellectivity, the
respect in which they most resemble God, to some considerable extent
“they also direct themselves.”
However, before turning to develop his detailed account of the divinely
directed but distinctively human approach to nature’s unique, universal,
ultimate goal, Aquinas tries to sum up his completed account of God as the
goal of nonintellective nature. As might be expected, the summing-up
depends heavily on his theory of the natural instruments or intermediaries
through which divine direction is imparted to all terrestrial things, events,
and states of affairs—his theory that mistakenly identifies those intermedi-
aries as the heavenly bodies and their movements.274 But much or all of
what he wants to say along those lines in his chapter 24 could also be said,
much more plausibly, if the heavenly bodies and their movements were
replaced throughout with the basic physical-chemical structure of the uni-
verse and the laws of nature.275
In line with the account of heavenly bodies presented in III.23, Aquinas
speaks here of the mover of any heavenly body as “an intellective sub-
stance.” But it’s clear, even in III.23, that any such created intellective
substance could be no more than an instrument for carrying out the plan
of the supreme intellective being that creates and governs the universe. So
the intellective movers that figure in III.24 can all be thought of as no more
than stand-ins for God as the prime mover and universal governor whose
action ultimately explains the character and operations associated with any
natural intermediaries, however they may be identified.
For instance, the first argument in III.24 is to the effect that the
“principal agent” of “the forms and movements of terrestrial bodies” must
be an intellective being working through natural instruments. In the argu-
ment as Aquinas wrote it, those natural instruments are of course identified
as the heavenly bodies, but it would work quite as well if the principal agent
were identified immediately as God and the natural instrumentation were
identified as the physical structure and laws of the universe. The modified
conclusion might then read this way: Therefore, the forms and the move-
ments of terrestrial bodies are caused and intended by God as the principal
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agent, but by the physical structure and laws of the universe as the [agent’s]
instrument.276 But at least one of Aquinas’s arguments in III.24 needs no
revising to be read as presenting the explanation of the teleological charac-
ter of incognizant nature in terms of God and the basic structure and laws
of nature:
it isn’t hard to see how natural bodies that lack cognition are moved
toward and act for an end. For they tend toward an end as they are
directed toward it by an intellective substance, in the way an arrow
tends toward a target as directed by an archer. For just as the arrow gets
its inclination toward a determinate end from the archer’s shooting it,
so do natural bodies get an inclination to natural ends from natural
movements, from which they get their forms, powers, and move-
ments.277 (24.2049)
Of course, by ‘natural movements’ in this argument Aquinas means those
associated with the  heavenly bodies, but  the designation  can easily be
applied to the most basic physical things, events, and states of affairs, whose
natural occurrences or changes are codified in the laws of nature.278
Aquinas’s summing-up explanation of goal-seeking among nonintel-
lective things concludes with two accounts designed to show how such
created things can be said to acquire divine likeness in being (A) perfected
in themselves and (B) causes of other things.279 And the way he puts these
accounts here shows, more clearly than before, just how likeness in respect
B may be seen as an outgrowth of likeness in respect A.
He begins  by explaining, in  connection  with  A,  that it makes no
difference whether we say that
even things that lack cognition can [i] operate for an end, [ii] seek
what is good on the basis of natural appetite, [iii] seek a divine likeness,
or [iv] seek their own perfection. . . . For in virtue of the fact that they
[iv] tend toward their own perfection, they [ii] tend toward what is
good, since anything is good to the extent to which it is perfected. But
in so far as anything [ii] tends toward what is good, it [iii] tends toward
a divine likeness, since anything is assimilated to God to the extent to
which it is good. But this or that particular good thing is desirable in
so far as it is a likeness of the first goodness. Therefore, anything [ii]
tends toward its own good because it [iii] tends toward a divine like-
ness, and not vice versa. And so it’s clear that all things [iii] seek a
divine likeness as [i] their ultimate end. (24.2051)
Having summarized and clarified his account of divine likeness in
respect A—in respect of a creature’s acquisition of perfection, or good-
ness—Aquinas takes up the diffusiveness of goodness, codified in the
Dionysian principle, and turns it into a bridge from A to B, likeness in
respect of causing other things.280
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On this basis it’s clear that to the extent to which anything is more
perfect in power and more outstanding in its grade of goodness, to that
extent it has a more general appetite for goodness and seeks it more
and carries it out more in connection with things remote from itself.
For imperfect things tend only to the good of their individual selves [—as
in acquiring food—] perfect things to the good of their species [—as in
producing and defending offspring —] more perfect things to the good
of the genus [—as in the sun’s equivocal causation of terrestrial ef-
fects]281—but God, who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of the
totality of being. That’s why some people say, and not inappropriately,
that goodness, considered just as such, is diffusive, because the better
anything is found to be, the more it diffuses its goodness to more
remote things.282 And . . . it must be that God, who is most perfect in
his goodness and most universally diffusive of his goodness, is in his
diffusiveness the exemplar of all diffusing agents. However, in so far as
anything diffuses goodness into other things, it becomes a cause of
other things. From this it is clear also that anything that tends toward
being a cause of other things tends toward a divine likeness and all the
same tends toward its own goodness. (24.2053)
In III.16–24 Aquinas repeatedly and emphatically identifies God as the
unique, universal, ultimate end of created things. He also provides a reason-
able amount of detail regarding the  inner structure  of nonintellective
nature’s possession of  and  tendency  to acquire more likeness to God,
having identified likeness to God as the mode in which God himself, the
exemplar of such likeness, can be nature’s goal in practice. And he provides
grounds on which to attribute “ends,” “appetites,” “intentions” or “tenden-
cies,” and “actions” to minerals and plants as well as to non-human animals,
lower and higher. But, of course, he doesn’t claim that any of those created
things literally cognizes or desires God or its own likeness to God. On the
contrary, especially in the summing-up in III.24, he emphasizes the need
for divine direction and impetus to make this universal teleology work:
it isn’t hard to see how natural bodies that lack cognition are moved
toward and act for an end. For they tend toward an end as they are
directed toward it by an intellective substance, in the way an arrow
tends toward a target as directed by an archer.283 (24.2049)
By this stage in Aquinas’s account we can  readily provide a short
description of the goal of all created things as he sees it: in theory, God
himself; in practice, likeness to God in respect of goodness or causality. Why
do they all intend that goal? Because God directs them toward it. Why does
God direct them toward it? As Aquinas has repeatedly shown in his account,
that goal is made up entirely of things that are variously good for various
created things, and so God’s motive might reasonably be identified as the
creator’s benevolence toward his creatures. Yes, but if that were the whole
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story, there’d be no need to tell it in terms of an ultimate end for created
things, or to stress the identification of that end as itself divine. Something
more than benevolence to creatures lies behind the story Aquinas has been
telling. To put the issue in terms he himself provides, what is the cosmic
archer’s target? What would motivate God to organize nature so as to
manifest a manifold likeness of his goodness?
When the question is put that way, it suggests the answer in terms of a
concept we’ve already seen to be important in Aquinas’s explanation
of God’s creating. “Speaking absolutely, . . . God’s goodness has no need of
things that  stand in an ordered relationship to it, except for purposes of
manifestation, which can be carried out appropriately in various ways” (QDV
24.3c).284
It pertained to God, therefore, to introduce his likeness among created things
most perfectly, to the extent to which that is compatible with created
nature. But created things cannot attain a perfect likeness of God on
the basis of just one species of created thing285 because, since a cause
surpasses its effect, what is in the cause simply and as one is found
complexly and as many in the effect, unless the effect belongs to the
species to which the cause belongs. . . . Therefore, in order that a
perfect likeness of God might be found in created things in the way that
pertains to a created thing, there had to be multiplicity and variety in
them.286 (SCG II.45.1220)
It seems that all the detailed development of the account of the ways in
which nature’s unique, universal, ultimate end is attained is to be under-
stood as Aquinas’s portrayal of the way God’s manifold manifestation is
worked out within nature itself.
Although manifold manifestation does not appear clearly as an ele-
ment in the account Aquinas provides in these chapters of SCG, it certainly
is a part of the parallel discussion in CT I.100–103, written soon after SCG.
For instance, here are the last sentence of 101 and the beginning of 102:
It’s for this reason, then, that all things have been made: in order to be
assimilated to the divine goodness. From this, therefore, we must ex-
tract the reason for the diversity and distinction among things. For
since it was impossible for the divine goodness to be represented
perfectly, because of the [metaphysical] distance of each and every
created thing from God, it was necessary that it be represented through
many things, so that what is lacking in one may be supplied in another.
(101.197–102.198)
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